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Challenge 
Civil society has experienced many changes in recent decades. Following a period of 
rapid growth in both scale and scope (nonprofit organizations account for 5–10% of 
GDP in most OECD countries; see Salamon et al 2013; Anheier 2014), and carried by 
growing policy expectations, resources and capacity, the past decade brought about a 
more complex, challenging environment for nongovernmental organizations including 
philanthropy: 
• Domestically and internationally, the rates at which civil society organizations 
(CSO) are being created slowed down significantly (www.uia.org; Anheier 
2017). In the 1980s and 1990s, international CSOs experienced significant 
expansion in scale and scope; and whilst their total number continues to grow, 
the frequency of newly founded organizations has dropped since the global 
financial crisis and continues to do so (Figures 1a and 1b). 
 
• Competition for financial resources intensified, putting pressure on capacity 
and sustainability, while at the same time, many countries adopted austerity 
budgets or shifted priorities and reduced public spending in areas where CSOs 
are typically active, from social service, health care and education to 
environmental sustainability or international assistance (OECD Social 
Expenditure Update). The funding of CSOs, which, according to Salamon et al 
(2013) relied on a mix of earned income (43% of total annual revenue), 
government grants and reimbursements (32%), and donations by individuals, 
foundations and corporations (25%) is changing. There is more pressure on 
earned income generation, and more demands for fewer public funds (Anheier 
2014: 441).  
 
Figure 1a: Growth in the number of international NGOs (1900–2016) 
 
 Source: http://ybio.brillonline.com/ybio/v5 27.06.2017 "©Union of International Associations 
 1997–present". 
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Figure 1b: The number of international NGOs founded, by year 
 
Source: http://ybio.brillonline.com/ybio/v5 27.06.2017 "© Union of International Associations  
1997–present". 
 
• While private investments from G20 countries to developing countries has 
been increasing in the past years, the Center for Global Prosperity (CGP) at the 
Hudson Institute (2016) estimates for 28 Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) countries and 11 non-DAC countries show that philanthropy comprises 
only $64 billion of a total of $513 billion of total private investments flows in 
2014. The share of philanthropy has declined in relative terms and remained 
fairly stable in absolute numbers. The Council of Foundations (2010) sees the 
reasons for this pattern in greater barriers that have been set up between 
donor and recipient countries that range from anti-terrorist finance measures 
to local tax issues.  
 
• Many countries either have or are considering introducing stricter regulations 
of CSOs, usually around issues of tax exemption and finance as well religion and 
advocacy (see www.icnl.org for overview). Internationally, changing geopolitics 
led to more restrictions on the cross-border operations and transactions of 
CSOs. Some G20 countries have imposed stricter controls of CSO-related 
financial flows and operations, often in the context of anti-terrorist measures 
(www.fatfplatform.org). As a result, barriers of entry as well as transaction, 
regulatory and compliance costs have increased.  
 
• The UN Human Rights Council, concerned that in many countries CSOs face 
threats (2016:2), emphasizes that “creating and maintaining a safe and 
enabling environment in which civil society can operate freely from hindrance 
and insecurity” (2016:3) supports member states in meeting their obligations 
and commitments, and fears that “without which equality, accountability and 
the rule of law are severely weakened…” (2016:3). 
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• Civil society itself is changing: advances especially in information and 
communication technologies and social innovations facilitated the growth of 
cyber activism, lobbying and even new international movements (Della Porta 
and Felicetti 2017; Hall 2017). 
Proposal 
The Potential of Civil Society 
Civil society is a highly diverse ensemble of many different organizations that range 
from small neighborhood associations to large international NGOs like Greenpeace, 
and from social service providers and relief agencies to foundations commanding 
billions of dollars. It is an arena of self-organization of citizens and established interests 
seeking voice and influence. Located between government or the state and the 
market, it is, according to Ernest Gellner (1994: 5) that “set of non-governmental 
institutions, which is strong enough to counter-balance the state, and, whilst not 
preventing the state from fulfilling its role of keeper of peace and arbitrator between 
major interests, can, nevertheless, prevent the state from dominating and atomizing 
the rest of society.“ For John Keane (1998:6), civil society is an “ensemble of legally 
protected non-governmental institutions that tend to be non-violent, self-organizing, 
self-reflexive, and permanently in tension with each other and with the state 
institutions that ‘frame’, constrict and enable their activities.” Taken together, CSOs 
express the capacity of society for self-organization and the potential for peaceful, 
though often contested, settlement of diverse private interests. 
 
Civil society organizations (CSOs) represent interests and advance causes that may or 
may not be deemed in the public benefit by a particular government or political 
parties, and, indeed, businesses and other CSOs. But by most measures, most CSOs are 
serving the public good. Yet there are grey areas between advocacy and politics as 
there are between profit-seeking and nonprofit making activities or between influence 
and interference. Indeed, regulations are needed to regulate and control the borders 
between government, business and civil society, as John G Simon et al (2006) argued, 
and to do so both nationally as well as internationally.  
 
As is the case for all institutions and organizations, political and regulatory frameworks 
shape the environment for CSOs as well. For several decades, most developed market 
economies have seen a general increase in the economic importance of CSOs as 
providers of health, social, educational and cultural services of many kinds. They have 
also seen new and renewed emphasis on the social and political roles of CSOs, usually 
in the context of debates about civic renewal. Indeed, these developments are taking 
place across many countries that otherwise differ much in their economic structures, 
politics cultures and social fabrics. They are driven, in large measure, by four broad 
perspectives that position CSOs in specific ways and allocate certain roles to them:  
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• First, CSOs are increasingly part of new public management approaches and 
what could be called a mixed economy of welfare with a heavy reliance on 
quasi-markets and competitive bidding processes. Expanded contracting 
regimes in health and social service provision, voucher programs of many kinds, 
and public-private partnerships are examples of this development. In essence, 
this policy approach sees CSOs as more efficient providers than public agencies, 
and as more trustworthy than for-profit businesses in markets where 
monitoring is costly and profiteering likely.  
 
• Second, they are seen as central to building and rebuilding the realm of civil 
society itself, and for strengthening the nexus between social capital and 
economic development. Attempts to revive or strengthen a sense of 
community and belonging, enhance civic mindedness and engagement, 
including volunteering and charitable giving, are illustrative of this perspective. 
With the social fabric changing, civic associations of many kinds are seen as the 
glue holding increasingly diverse societies together. The basic assumption is 
that people embedded in dense networks of associational bonds are not only 
less prone to social problems of many kinds but also economically more 
productive and politically more involved.  
 
• Third, CSOs are part of a wider social accountability perspective that sees these 
organizations as instruments of greater transparency, and heightened 
accountability for improving governance of public institutions and business 
alike. Such mechanisms include citizen advisory boards, community councils, 
participatory budgeting, public expenditure tracking, monitoring of public 
service delivery, and consumer protection in many markets and fields. The 
underlying premise is that conventional accountability enforcement 
mechanisms like elections, public oversight agencies and the media are falling 
short; CSOs are to become the social whistleblower and advocates for voices 
that would otherwise remain unheard. 
 
• Finally, there is the policy perspective that views CSOs as a source of innovation 
in addressing social problems of many kinds. Indeed, CSOs are assumed to be 
better at such innovations than governments typically are: their smaller scale 
and greater proximity to communities affected and concerned makes them 
creative agents in finding solutions. Governments are encouraged to seek a 
new form of partnership with CSOs aimed at identifying, vetting and scaling up 
social innovations to build more flexible, less entrenched, public responses. 
 
While CSOs can bring advantages, they also have inherent weaknesses, including 
(Anheier and Hammack, 2013; Anheier 2014: 214):  
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o Resource inadequacy, whereby goodwill and voluntary contributions alone 
cannot generate resources adequate and reliable enough to cope with 
many of the problems facing G20 countries.  
o Free-rider problems, whereby those who benefit have little or no incentive 
to contribute, stand in the way of sustainable resourcing, too.  
o Particularism, whereby CSOs focus on particular subgroups only while 
ignoring others, which can lead to service gaps; conversely, if CSOs serve 
broader segments of the population, they encounter legitimacy problems. 
o Paternalism, whereby CSO services represent neither a right nor an 
entitlement but are at the discretion of particular interests that may not 
necessarily reflect wider social needs, let alone the popular will. 
o Accountability problems, whereby CSOs, while acting as accountability 
enforcers and pushing transparency, are themselves inflected by such 
insufficiencies.  
 
The challenge is clear: how can the advantages CSOs offer to society, and indeed to 
governments, be strengthened while minimizing any disadvantages? What is the right 
policy framework for governments and CSOs to balance their respective interests while 
realizing the potential of civil society? What rules and regulations, measures and 
incentives would be required? What balance between public control and public 
support is adequate?  
 
Unfortunately, in recent years, many measures and regulations try to control rather 
than enable CSOs. Governments seem unclear as to what role or roles CSOs can 
assume in future, and what priorities to set. Some see them primarily as service 
providers and shun their advocacy potential, others see them as laboratories of new 
ideas and innovations, and others yet see them interfering the policy process, 
seemingly trying to influence if not dictate governmental agendas.  
 
As Table 1 for G20 countries and Table 2 for a sample of other countries show in 
section “Existing Agreements, Policies and Monitoring”, governments send 
contradictory signals, and it is unlikely that CSOs can be service providers without 
being advocates and generators of social trust without operating as accountability 
enforcers. At one level, CSOs become parallel actors that may complement or even 
counteract state activities, and compete with business. At another, the state and CSOs 
are part of ever more complex and elaborate public-private partnerships and typically 
work in complementary fashion with other agencies, public and private.  
  
Both are possible, as traditional notions of public benefit and public responsibilities 
have shifted from the state to other actors, which bring in the role of nonprofit 
organizations as private actors for the public good. The role of the state as ‘enabler’ 
and ‘animator’ of private action for public service has increased, and will continue to 
do so. This, in turn, will continue to push and pull CSOs in all the four directions 
illustrated by the various perspectives; amounting, in the end, to a positioning that is 
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as contradictory as it is dynamic, and as unsettled as it is increasingly recognized vital 
and important in economic, social and political terms.  
 
In societies with different views of the public good, civil society creates institutional 
diversity, contributes to innovation and prevents monopolistic structures by adding a 
sphere of self-organization next to that of state administration and the market. Indeed, 
as we have seen, economists have suggested that the very origin of the nonprofit 
sector is found in demand heterogeneity for quasi-public goods — yet it is only now 
that we begin to understand the policy implication of such theorizing when looked at 
through a sociological lens: Civil society can become a field of experimentation, an 
area for trying out new ideas that may not necessarily have to stand the test of either 
the market or the ballot box. In this sense, CSOs add to the problem-solving capacity of 
modern societies. Yet these potentials have to be balanced against the weaknesses of 
CSOs, which also calls for policy responses seeking a balance between controlling and 
enabling measures in terms of regulation and support.  
 
State–Civil Society Relation  
Of course, the relationship between civil society and government is complex and 
multifaceted.  The meaning and magnitude of the relation differ by type of 
organization (larger international vs. smaller local CSOs), field (social services vs. 
international development), and levels of government involvement (e.g., national and 
international). What is more, the relationship involves different aspects such as 
funding (grants, fee-for-service contracts, concessionary loans, etc.), non-monetary 
support (goods and services in kind), mandates (legal requirements to involve CSOs in 
implementing policy), and, of course, regulations and accountability. 
What are the theoretical rationales why government and CSOs develop some form of 
relationship?  Economic theory offers three answers to this question, each casting 
CSOs in a different role: (i) substitute and supplement; (ii) complement; and (iii) 
adversary (see Steinberg, 2006; Anheier, 2014, Chapter 8, 16). 
The notion that CSOs are supplements and substitutes to government rests on the 
public goods and government failure argument first advanced by Weisbrod (1988): 
they offer a solution to public goods provision in fields where preferences are 
heterogeneous, allowing government to concentrate on median voter demand. CSOs 
step in to compensate for governmental undersupply. Operational independence and 
zero-sum thinking characterize their overall relation as alternative providers, and 
neither government nor CSOs have incentives to cooperate. 
The theory that CSOs are complements to government was proposed by Salamon 
(2002), and finds its expression in the third-party government thesis whereby CSOs act 
as agents in implementing and delivering on public policy. CSOs are typically the first 
line of defence in addressing emerging social problems of many kinds, but face 
resource insufficiencies over time that, in turn, can be compensated for by 
government funding. The theory implies that (i) nonprofit weaknesses correspond to 
strengths of government, i.e., public sector revenue to guarantee nonprofit funding 
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and regulatory frameworks to ensure equity; and (ii) the financing (government) and 
providing (nonprofit sector) roles are split. 
Transaction cost theory, which also supports the complementary role, suggests that it 
may be more efficient for government to delegate service provision by contracting out 
non-core functions to nonprofit organizations – a central premise of New Public 
Management approaches to modernize the public sector. Indeed, Kramer (1994) states 
that contracting-out brings a number of advantages to the public sector, such as 
avoiding start-up costs, generating more accurate cost determinants, avoiding civil 
service staff regulations, and easing the process of altering and stopping programs. 
Even though there are also disadvantages involved (e.g., difficulty to maintain equal 
standards, loss of public control and accountability, monitoring costs), both 
government and CSOs have incentives to cooperate. 
The theory that CSOs and governments are adversaries is supported by public goods 
arguments (see Boris and Steuerle 2006) and social movement theory (Della Porta and 
Felicetti 2017): if demand is heterogeneous, minority views may not be well reflected 
in public policy; hence self-organization of minority preferences will rise against 
majoritarian government. Moreover, organized minorities are more effective in 
pressing government (social movements, demonstration projects, think tanks) than 
unorganized protests; however, if CSOs advocate minority positions, the government 
may in turn try to defend the majority perspective, leading to potential political 
conflict. 
Young (2000) suggests a triangular model of government–civil society relations (Figure 
2), and argues that to varying degrees all three types of relations are present at any 
one time, but that some assume more importance during some periods than in others.  
Figure 2: Government–Civil Society Relations 
 
     Complementary 
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Najam’s Four-C’s model (2000) offers a more detailed view of nonprofit–government relations 
by examining the extent to which their respective organizational goals and means overlap (see 
Figure 3): 
• Cooperative: If the goals and means are similar, then government and 
nonprofit organizations develop a cooperative relationship, for example the 
cooperation between the Canadian government and the International 
Campaign to Ban Landmines.    
 
• Complementary: If the goals are similar but the means are dissimilar, then a 
complementary relationship between government and nonprofit organizations 
emerges. For example, many charities in the field of social service provision and 
community health care complement basic government services.    
 
• Co-optive: If the goals are dissimilar and means are similar, then government 
tries to build a co-optive relationship with nonprofit organizations. An example 
would be the humanitarian assistance funds channelled to local grassroots 
organizations in African countries for programs that are similar to 
governmental ones. In such situations, government may try to co-opt 
grassroots organizations and nonprofits to further its own goals.   
 
• Confrontational: If the goals and means are both dissimilar, then government 
and the nonprofit sector are in a confrontational relationship. Examples include 
the activities of Greenpeace to pressure governments on environmental issues, 
an advocacy group demanding better welfare services for the urban poor, or 
the anti-globalization groups demonstrating against the World Trade 
Organization.   
Figure 3: Four C’s Model of Government – Civil Society Relations 
  GOALS  
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Government–Civil Society Relations Reconsidered 
Recent developments in government – civil society relation at many national levels as 
well as internationally suggest another, more geo-political perspective: according to 
Dahrendorf (1992), in spite of their high potential for conflict modern societies 
nonetheless command a large repertoire of mediating institutions and organizations. 
Dahrendorf was fundamentally concerned with the question of how complex societies 
can resolve conflict without either curbing individual liberty or sacrificing a potential 
for modernization. His answer lay in a need for institutions that are capable of 
providing creative solutions. The world today, however, differs from the post-war 
period. The framework for the economy and the state today is a globalized world and 
as such is characterized by significant governance issues (Hertie School of Governance 
2013). These problems are due to the growing imbalances between the forces of 
globalized markets on the one hand, and the potential for governance and control on 
the other. 
The policy challenge is clear: how can the advantages CSOs bring be strengthened 
while minimizing any disadvantages? How can the profoundly adversial relations 
transformed into complementary or supplementary ones?  How can the goals, ways 
and means of governments, including international organizations on the one hand, and 
civil society on the other, be better coordinated and reconciled? What is the right 
policy framework to balance their respective interests while realizing the potential of 
civil society? What rules and regulations, measures and incentives would be required? 
What balance of public control and support is adequate? 
Recommendations 
Civil society, challenged in many ways yet harboring huge potential, finds itself at a 
crossroads. It is time to act, and chart a way forward. Fifteen years after then Secretary 
General Kofi Annan initiated the first ever panel to examine UN-civil society relations 
(the Cardoso Report, 2004); it seems urgent to revisit the role of CSOs in a geopolitical 
environment that has radically changed. There is an urgent need to cut through the 
cacophony of policies regulating CSOs, as Tables 1 and 2 show, and to point to policy 
options.  
Therefore, we propose an independent high-level Commission of eminent persons to 
examine the contradictory policy environment for civil society organizations, and to 
review the increasingly complex space civil society encounters domestically as well as 
internationally. Working closely with, but independently of, the Civil-20 (http://civil-
20.org), the Commission is to make concrete proposals for improvements. 
The charge to the Commission would be to: 
• Review the policy environment for CSOs and identify its strengths and 
weaknesses across the G20 countries. 
• Propose model regulations for different legal and political systems, and for the 
four roles allocated to CSOs in the context of CSO comparative advantages and 
disadvantages. 
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• Point to areas for legislative reform as to the regulatory and enabling functions 
of the state.  
• Identify best practices in government–civil society as well as business – civil 
society relations. 
• Explore the possibility of a future observatory of civil society, especially at the 
international level, perhaps linked to the Civil-20. 
We further propose that the process for such an independent commission should be 
initiated under the German Presidency of the G20, and to be taken up by Argentina, as 
it prepares to take over the Presidency for 2018. At the G20 summit in Argentina that 
year, the Commission is to report to G20 member states. 
 
Implementation Overview 
 
We propose that the process for such an independent commission should be initiated 
under the German Presidency of the G20, and to be taken up by Argentina, as it 
prepares to take over the Presidency for 2018.   
 
As part of this transition phase, a group of initiators with representatives of the 
German and Argentinian governments plus leading academic are to provide an 
appropriate evidence base, to formulate the charge to the Committee, and to suggest 
potential members for confirmation by Argentina. Each G20 country should be invited 
to propose Committee members. 
 
At the G20 summit in Argentina in 2018, the Commission is to submit its final report to 
G20 member states. 
 
 
Existing Agreements, Policies and Monitoring 
 
Independent of the work and documents provided by the Civil-20, we would like to 
give a broad overview of existing institutions, policies, laws, but most importantly the 
overall framework in which NGOs/CSOs operate. 
 
Committees on Non-Governmental Organizations: 
 
1) United Nations Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations: 
http://csonet.org/?menu=105  
It is responsible for accrediting non-governmental organizations with 
consultative status at the United Nations. Established in 1946, it reports directly 
to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). 
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2) OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC): 
http://www.oecd.org/development/developmentassistancecommitteedac.htm  
It is a unique international forum of many of the largest funders of aid. The 
World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and UNDP participate as 
observers. It promotes development co-operation and other policies so as to 
contribute to sustainable development, including pro-poor economic growth, 
poverty reduction, improvement of living standards in developing countries, 
and a future in which no country will depend on aid. 
 
3) Civic Solidarity Platform: http://civicsolidarity.org/page/about-us  
The Civic Solidarity Platform (CSP) is a network of over 70 human rights 
organizations from numerous OSCE member states, active within the OSCE. The 
CSP advocates human rights issues in OSCE bodies and in member states, and 
organizes NGO conferences and workshops on current policy issues. It is 
responsible for the annual parallel NGO conference that convenes before the 
OSCE Ministerial Council, where demands to the OSCE are phrased and 
recommendations are adopted. 
 
4) European Economic and Social Committee: 
http://www.eesc.europa.eu/?i=portal.en.civil-society  
Committed to European integration, the EESC contributes to strengthening the 
democratic legitimacy and effectiveness of the European Union by enabling 
civil society organizations from the Member States to express their views at the 
European level. 
 
5) Civil Society Policy Forum 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/events/2017/04/21/civil-society-policy-forum  
Civil Society Policy Forum happens alongside Spring and Annual Meetings of the 
World Bank Group and the International Monetary Fund. 
 
Organizations that monitor implemented measures include: 
   
a) The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (http://www.icnl.org/). 
b) CIVICUS (http://www.civicus.org/).  
c) USAID “CSO Sustainability Index” (https://www.usaid.gov/what-we-
do/democracy-human-rights-and-governance/cso-sustainability-index-
methodology).  
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Note: The purpose of these two tables is not to support any argument that only 
minimal regulations for CSOs would be required in most circumstances; rather they are 
to illustrate that, frequently, adequate state–civil society policies have not been found 
and that regulations hinder, obstruct and even contradict the potentials CSOs harbor 
for economy and society.  
 
Table 1 – Recent Regulations or Current Proposals Addressing Civil Society 
Organization in G20 Countries 
Country Legislative Action Description 
Argentina None 
 Australia None 
 Brazil None 
 Canada None 
 
China The Overseas NGO Management Law 
The 2017 Overseas NGO Law raises the barriers for international 
NGOs seeking to work in China. Chinese organizations are 
sometimes required to report international contacts to 
authorities and sometimes to seek approval for visits, 
international cooperation, foreign donations, etc. Chinese 
organizations, particularly NGOs that collaborate or receive 
funding from foreign organizations are monitored closely.   
France None 
 Germany None 
 
India 
Audits 
On January 11, 2017, the Supreme Court of India ordered an 
audit of 3 million NGOs and penal action against those not 
submitting their records on time in accordance with General 
Financial Rules 2005. It is mandated by March 31, 2017. The 
targeted NGOs are those receiving funds from the government 
or foreign sources under the Foreign Contribution Regulation Act 
(FCRA). According to the Supreme Court bench members, "mere 
blacklisting of NGOs who do not file annual statements will not 
suffice but also action must be initiated like criminal proceedings 
for misappropriation and civil action for recovery of given funds.” 
The order came after a finding was cited that only 10% of NGOs 
filed annual income and expenditure statements. 
Foreign 
Contributions 
Regulation Act 
2010 (FCRA) 
The government has blacklisted dozens of NGOs for failing to 
adhere to different aspects of the FCRA, including 69 NGOs in 
March 2015 alone. In addition, the Ministry of Home Affairs 
cancelled the FCRA registration of 1,142 NGOs that received 
funding from foreign sources in one state (Andhra Pradesh) for 
failure to file annual returns for 2009 to 2012. 
Foreign 
Contribution 
Regulation Rules 
The Ministry of Home Affairs issued a revised version of the 
Foreign Contribution Regulation Amendment Rules in December 
2015. The application process for registration under the FCRA is 
now completely online and reporting requirements on foreign 
contributions have increased significantly. 
Indonesia Cyber-related laws 
The proposed amendments to the Electronic Information and 
Transactions Law aim to protect children by criminalizing 
"cyberbullying." Since it was enacted in 2008, the government 
has used the EIT Law to detain activists by charging the state's 
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critics with defamation. In 2015, the Indonesian branch of the 
Southeast Asia Freedom of Expression Network (SafeNet) 
documented 11 such online defamation cases against activists. 
The EIT Law has also been reported to have been used to 
prosecute dozens of people using Facebook, Twitter, and mobile 
applications such as WhatsApp and Blackberry Messenger. 
Italy None 
 Japan None 
 Korea None 
 
Mexico Income Tax Law Reform 
The provisions modified in the Income Tax Law from November 
30, 2016, state that CSOs will be subject to forced liquidation if 
they lose the authorization to receive tax deductible receipts and 
they are not able to regain the authorization within three 
months after it has been revoked. CSOs will have to be certified 
by private organizations that will classify them as one of three 
types of organization (A, AA, AAA). This certification process is 
voluntary, but will have different tax incentives for certified 
CSOs, creating disparate treatment and dissuading donors from 
supporting the neediest organizations located. However, there 
will be fewer authorizations required to receive tax deductible 
receipts for CSOs dedicated to scientific or technological 
research. 
Russia 
Federal Law on 
Public Associations 
/ Federal Law on 
Noncommercial 
Organizations 
The Amendments to Article 8 of the Federal Law on Public 
Associations and Article 2 of the Federal Law on Noncommercial 
Organizations contain a problematic definition of “political 
activity”, which is relevant because “conducting political activity” 
is one of the criteria for an NCO to be qualified as an 
organization carrying out the functions of a foreign agent under 
Russia’s Law on NCOs. The new definition remains vague and 
may make it even easier for the government to label almost any 
activity as “political.” 
“Yarovaya 
Package” 
The two federal laws known as the “Yarovaya Package” 
introduced changes to 21 laws. They were officially designed to 
provide additional measures to counter terrorism and ensure 
public safety. However, this package makes it easier to apply 
criminal and administrative penalties against a broad range of 
people, while increasing penalties for many crimes and offenses, 
some of which are loosely defined. In addition, the package 
requires mobile phone and internet service providers to record 
and store all communications and activities of all users and make 
stored records available to authorized government bodies at 
their request. It also imposes undue restrictions on the 
missionary activities of religious organizations and their 
members.  
Federal Law No. 287-FZ on Amending Federal Law on Non-
Commercial Organizations (NCO) in Terms of Establishing the 
Status of NCO–Provider of Public Benefit Services (PBS) entered 
into force on January 1, 2017. The law assigns the status of 
"NCO–PBS” to some Socially Oriented Organizations (SOOs), 
including those which had the special code “provision of social 
services” given to them during registration (ОКВЭД). The law 
also provides a procedure for the assignment and removal of this 
status, and specifies the priority status of such organizations in 
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instances of state support of such SOOs. 
Federal Law No. 449-FZ on Amendments to Article 31-1 of the 
Federal Law on NCOs (in Terms of Specification of Measures of 
Support of Socially Oriented NCOs–PBS by the Public Authorities 
and Local Self-Government)" entered into force on January 1, 
2017. The law establishes a two-year term for the provision of 
state support to NCO-PBS and also expands the list of types of 
support for SOOs by government bodies (provision of free 
airtime and print space, training and professional development 
of employees and volunteers). 
Federal Law of March 7, 2017 No. 27-FZ on Amendments to the 
Federal Law on the Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian 
Federation entered into force on March 17, 2017. The essence of 
the law’s purpose is to create legal regulation of the powers of 
the Prosecutor General in conducting inspections of NCOs and 
other organizations. 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Law on 
Associations and 
Foundations 
The law and regulations attempt to cut processing time by 
obliging the Ministry of Labor and Social Development to 
complete licensing within 60 days, reduce the minimum number 
of association founders to ten, widen the scope of permissible 
activities for associations and foundations to undertake, and 
clarify “public benefit status.” It also limits CSO registration, 
including all violations to Islamic Sharia, contradictions to public 
morals, and breaches of national unity. Further, it prohibits 
foreign foundations and associations from establishing branches 
inside Saudi Arabia, and places constraints on the contact of 
domestic associations and foundations with foreign 
organizations. 
South 
Africa None 
Several bills calling for stricter regulation of civil society are being 
debated  
Turkey 
Multiple new laws 
after the 2016 
coup attempt; 
Constitution 
reform 
In April 2017, through a referendum, the people of Turkey 
narrowly voted in favor of reforming their constitution and more 
than 2,000 laws in a way that removes many of the checks on 
executive power. 
 
Many instances of direct interference and even closure of CSOs 
and foundations 
UK None 
 
USA None but likely 
Heritage Foundation initiates a comprehensive review of all 
federal funding directed to non-profit organizations, including 
universities, to assess whether they pursue partisan goals or 
advance the common good. 
President Trump suggests lifting limitations on political activities 
by religious (Christian) congregations. 
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Table 2 – Recent CSO Regulation in Other Countries 
 
Country Law Description 
Hungary 
No formal law 
Multiple attacks on NGOs that are allegedly involved in sponsoring 
political activity (like any Soros institutions–"Viktor Orban's 
government has denounced NGOs funded by George Soros for trying 
to "illegitimately" influence political life.") 
 
On September 8th, 2016 Hungarian police raided the offices of two 
nonprofits, Ökotárs Foundation and DemNet Hungary, as well as the 
homes of their leaders, seizing documents and data. While no 
charges have been filed, they are accused of distributing foreign 
grant money to leftist political parties, which is against Hungarian 
law. 
Poland 
New proposed 
law on public 
protests 
In March 2017 Poland’s top court has given the green light to a 
controversial bill limiting public gatherings, which Polish President 
Andrzej Duda declined to sign late last year. . The legislation 
introduces the concept of “periodic meetings” for rallies organized 
repeatedly in the same place and on the same date, giving such 
gatherings priority over other meetings. Under the new law, 
unrelated meetings must take place at least 100 meters away from 
any meeting designated “periodic”.  
Malaysia 2016 National 
Security Act  
The Act allows the National Security Council to designate “security 
areas” in the country, in which security forces can carry out 
warrantless searches, seizures of property, and arrests. Deaths 
caused by security forces in these areas would not need to be 
judicially investigated. The government states that this law is meant 
to prevent terrorism, while the international community considers 
the law to be a threat to democracy and human rights. 
Zimbabwe 
Computer 
Crime Bill, 
Cyber Crime 
Bill - proposed 
The government is developing a Computer Crime and Cyber Crime 
Bill that would limit citizens’ access to information. The legislation 
would allow authorities to arbitrarily seize mobile phones, tablets 
and laptops; monitor private communications; interrupt broadband 
service; and sentence violators to imprisonment. The legislation 
comes at a time when the government is responding to anti-
government protests that have largely been organized and shared via 
social media.  
Jordan 
Anti-Money 
Laundering 
Law and 
Counter–
Terrorism 
Financing Law  
The Government of Jordan announced the withdrawal of the draft 
NGO Law from the legislative agenda; instead, the government is 
working on preparing an overarching legal framework for social 
work, including an NGO Law. In addition, on April 5, 2017, the 
Council of Ministers issued a decision, which stipulates that the 
requirements of the Anti-Money Laundering Law and Counter–
Terrorism Financing Law of 2007 now apply to CSOs. CSOs are 
therefore now required to conduct due diligence on resources of 
funds and vendors, and failure to do so will subject them to penalties 
that may include detention, suspension or a fine 
Nigeria 
Cybercrime 
(Prohibition 
Prevention) Act 
2015 
The Cybercrime Act 2015 creates a legal, regulatory and institutional 
framework for the prohibition, prevention, detection, investigation 
and prosecution of cybercrimes and for other related matters. 
However, it is said to be “a serious threat” to CSOs and media 
houses, according to an April 2016 report from African Media 
Barometer. Three journalists have been jailed since its passing for 
what they wrote on the Internet, including criticisms of corruption in 
the banking sector.  
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Cambodia 
No new law, 
but attacks on 
civil society 
The first half of 2016 saw numerous prominent opposition politicians 
and civil society leaders arrested on spurious charges. There have 
also been calls for NGOs to be suspended or shut down due to 
allegedly violating the “political neutrality” clause of the Law on 
Associations and NGOs (LANGO). There have been reports that 
protests have consistently been shut down and protesters detained 
without legal justification. 
Ethiopia 
Cyber Crime 
Law 
In June 2016, Ethiopia's parliament passed a Cybercrimes Law, 
known as Computer Crime Proclamation. The law provides for 
serious penalties for a wide range of online activities and gives 
authorities greater surveillance and censorship powers that will limit 
access to information on digital platforms. The adoption of this law 
followed a shutdown of Facebook, Viber, and WhatsApp in parts of 
the Oromia region. In addition, more than 1,000 people considered 
"ringleaders/bandits" were reportedly arrested for participating in 
anti-government protests in Ethiopia. 
 
The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights visited 
Ethiopia in the first week of May 2017 and said he would push the 
government to allow his agency to investigate rights abuses. 
Ethiopia's Human Rights Commission has said at least 669 people 
have been killed in protests that began in November 2015 
Ecuador 
Ministerial 
Agreement No. 
12  
The Ministry of Economic and Social Inclusion published Ministerial 
Agreement No. 12 on October 25, 2016. It stipulates that social 
organizations will only have their statutes approved and obtain legal 
personality if their aims and objectives are framed as defense of 
groups of priority attention or populations that are in a state of 
poverty and vulnerability; promotion of development and social 
mobility; and strengthening the economy. 
 
Regulation 180 of April 25, 2016 addresses the "competition for the 
selection and designation of the main and alternate directors and 
alternate representatives from civil society to the National Councils 
for Gender, Intergenerationals, People and Nationalities, Disabilities, 
and Human Mobility". The call to fill the seats for civil society 
representatives at the National Councils began in January 2017. 
Pakistan 
Prevention of 
Electronic 
Crimes Act 
(PECA) 
NGOs expressed concern that their recommendations to bring the 
Act into a human rights framework were ignored by the government 
and legislatives bodies. Through this Act, the government can force 
Internet companies to remove or block access to any “speech, sound, 
data, writing, image, or video,” without court approval. The 
government could also acquire legal powers to censor and track 
Internet users, criminalize computer security researchers and hand 
over personal data to foreign powers.  
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